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Abstract. The distinction between mechanisms that generate biological variation and mech-
anisms that modify it has been important in contemporary Biology, especially since the estab-
lishment of the Evolutionary Synthesis (ES) in the first part of the twentieth century. In the ES,
and in its subsequent legacy to evolutionary biology, the focus was directed at mechanisms
that modify biological variation. In recent years, evo-devo (Evolutionary Developmental Bi-
ology) emerged as an area of knowledge that proposes to extend the ES in many forms. In
this sense, given that evo-devo integrates different areas of Biology, different types of mech-
anisms can be found. In order to understand evo-devo mechanisms, as well as its relation
with the ES, we analyzed the role that evo-devo mechanisms play with respect to biological
variation. The main question in our analysis was: do evo-devo mechanisms have a function
of generators and/or modifiers of biological variation? We focused on three evo-devo mecha-
nisms: environmental induction, hypervariability/somatic selection and developmental bias.
Our analysis showed a different characterization of the action of evo-devo mechanisms. This
heterogeneity in the role of evo-devo mechanisms shows that, in general, the distinction is
maintained but there is a mechanism that presents a dual role. Our analysis indicates that,
at least with respect to mechanisms, evo-devo extends and departs from what was proposed
in the evolutionary synthesis.
Keywords: Evo-devo • biological mechanisms • biological hierarchies • mechanisms that
generate biological variation • mechanisms that modify variation
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1. Generating and modifying biological variation and
evo-devo mechanisms
Genetics of Populations, Evolutionary Ecology, and Classical Genetics are the areas
of knowledge of the Evolutionary Synthesis (hereinafter ES) that deal with mech-
anisms of evolution (Arthur 1997). One of the most important conceptual distinc-
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tions within this group of theories relates to the differentiation between mechanisms
that generate biological variation (hereinafter Mgs) and mechanisms that modify it
(hereinafter Mms). In this sense, Classical Genetics researchers have proposed a great
number of mechanisms that generate variation, which are known as “mutation in a
broad sense” and include: mutation, recombination, macro-deletions, duplications,
inversions, hybridization, etc. (Endler and McLellan 1988). On the other hand, Ge-
netics of Populations mainly generated models to describe the action of mechanisms
that only modify variation: natural selection, mutation, gene flow and genetic drift
(see, for example, Templeton 2006, Hedrick 2011).
However, this classification between Mgs and Mms has some important excep-
tions. On the one hand, we acknowledge that in the canonical version of the ES,
mutation exhibits certain peculiarities, since it is considered that in situations where
there are low mutation rates it acts only as an Mg, and in situations with high muta-
tion rates it acts as an Mm, though a weak or unimportant one (Fisher 1930; Haldane
1933). We will return to the particularities of mutation as a biological mechanism
and its dual role in the next section. Also, in recent years there has been some debate
about the “creative role” of natural selection, making this mechanism a candidate to
be an Mg (see, for example, Forber 2005; Nanay 2005; Martinez and Moya 2009).
Unlike the case of mutation, the debate on the classic “destructive role” versus a sup-
posedly neglected “creative role” of natural selection has had different characteristics
than the ones proposed in the distinction made by the ES. Nevertheless, this discus-
sion is another case that points toward complexity in the actions of mechanisms in
evolution. In this context, the recovery of the complexity of evolutionary mechanisms
is important not only to clarify the status of the different evolutionary mechanisms
that diverse areas of knowledge propose (either from the classic areas of knowledge
within the ES or from others), but also because it is a possible path to understand the
type of contributions that each area of knowledge makes to evolutionary biology.
The ES was the theoretical system accepted and used to account for evolutionary
phenomena between the 1930s and 1970s. Since then, the ES was criticized for hav-
ing problems in dealing with several phenomena, like molecular, macroevolutionary
and ontogenetic phenomena. Among the identified difficulties of the ES appears the
fact that it has proposed only a few mechanisms — the ones mentioned earlier —
to deal with evolutionary phenomena. For example, Amundson says that, “[w]hen
Synthesis theorists speak of “evolutionary mechanisms” they mean population ge-
netic processes, usually involving selection (but possibly drift or other parameters)”
(Amundson 2005, p.167). Since then there has been agreement on the necessity of
extending the ES and also different attempts to succeed in doing so (just to name
a few examples, see Stanley 1975; Gould 1982; Buss 1983; Jablonka 2006; Müller
2007; Pigliucci 2007; Pigliucci and Müller 2010). One of the areas of knowledge
often mentioned as important in the extension and modification of the ES is Evolu-
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tionary Developmental Biology (hereinafter evo-devo) (Müller 2007; Pigliucci 2007).
Evo-devo has presented different research programs (Laubichler 2007; Müller 2008).
However, within this heterogeneity it is clear that one of its main objectives is the in-
tegration of the study of the evolution and development of organisms (Love 2003).
The extension to the ES that evo-devo proposes takes many forms. To name a few:
the consideration of development not only as a buffer for genetic variation but also
as a direct actor in the generation of evolutionary novelties where non-genetic prop-
erties of development (epigenetic) are relevant (Muller 2007); the importance of
modularity and phenotypic plasticity as causes in the evolution of organisms (Muller
2007); the consideration of a creative role of the environment as co-responsible for
the evolution of phenotypes (Gilbert and Epel 2009; Odling-Smee 2010) in addition
to its classic characterization as filter; and, more in line with the theme of this work,
the proposal of other mechanisms, rather than natural selection, as responsible for
evolutionary directionality (Arthur 2002; Muller 2007).
In this context, in order to understand in what sense the ES has been extended,
how evo-devo has been involved, and also what new challenges must be faced in the
coming years, herein we analyze whether evo-devo’s mechanisms act as Mgs or as
Mms, or if they are mechanisms that can act in both ways and hence have a dual
role. As will become clear in the following sections, we address the roles of evo-devo
mechanisms with respect to biological variation in terms of the ES categories. We
recognize that the most followed strategy to generate an extension to the ES has
been by means of altering and changing the fundamental categories and conceptu-
alizations of this theoretical system. Undoubtedly, this strategy is extremely useful
and necessary because it provides strategies capable of incorporating the theoretical,
phenomenological, and ontological diversity that was generated in the last decades.
In this line, Brigandt points out that “some aspects of evo-devo mandate a revised,
broadened philosophical conception of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation”
(Brigandt 2015, p.136), and Mc Manus says that this kind of strategy “ultimately
seeks to offer an alternative to the current main conceptions of what is a mechanism”
(Mc Manus 2011, p.533). Also, this strategy involves denying traditional distinctions
as proximate-ultimate causation (Calcott 2013). With regard to this distinction, West-
Eberhard expresses a common theme within evo-devo: “the proximate-ultimate dis-
tinction has given rise to a new confusion, namely, a belief that proximate causes of
phenotypic variation have nothing to do with ultimate, evolutionary explanation”
(West-Eberhard 2003, p.11). However, there is another type of strategy that still
needs to be executed: analysis of the extension to the ES considering its own cat-
egories and conceptualizations. This will allow for a better understanding of which
are the new analytic and heuristic paths that need to be followed and incorporated,
as well as of the boundaries of pre-existing categories. Of course, our position is that
these two strategies are not antagonistic, but rather absolutely complementary.
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Given the objective of the paper and the general strategy chosen to achieve it,
our main hypothesis is that although the general distinction of mechanisms between
generators and/or modifiers of biological variation is maintained in evo-devo, at least
one evo-devo mechanism can be recognized that presents a clear and equivalent dual
role (i.e., it can act consistently both as an Mg or as an Mm). This situation represents
a partial extension and departure from what was proposed in the ES for the role of
mechanisms with respect to biological variation.
To address our hypothesis, the present paper is organized as follows. In the second
section, we will highlight some general ideas about mechanisms in the ES and in its
extended and hierarchical version. Then, we will briefly characterize the two types
of mechanisms that operate in Biology: mechanisms that generate and mechanisms
that modify biological variation. In the third section, we will analyze, following our
hypothesis, three mechanisms that were proposed within evo-devo. Finally, on the
basis of previous considerations, in the last section we will present some general
conclusions and a discussion.
2. Searching for the criteria to recognize mechanisms that
modify and/or generate biological variation
2.1. Initial considerations about the analysis of mechanisms
At first, it is important to recognize that we are following the implied notion of mech-
anisms in the canonical version of the ES. Even if the architects of the ES did not ex-
plain it or make it explicit, for this theoretical construction it was clear what a mech-
anism did. Templeton states it as follows: “Population genetics has always played a
central role in evolutionary biology as it deals with the mechanisms by which evo-
lution occurs within populations and species, the ultimate basis of all evolutionary
change” (Templeton 2006, p.ix). The analysis of evo-devo mechanisms is based on
this notion. We also use a distinction present in the ES about mechanisms’ action;
there are those that modify variation (Mms) and others that originate it (Mgs), giv-
ing rise to the possibility of a dual role. This distinction, as was stated in the previ-
ous section, is a factual situation in the ES. It is precisely from these categories and
conceptualizations of the ES that we will try to extract the criteria to analyze the
mechanisms suggested in evo-devo.
Secondly, it is important to note that our analysis of evo-devo mechanisms pre-
sents another fundamental aspect that should be considered and that is often ignored
when considering the theoretical core of the ES. This additional complexity refers to
one of the characteristics of the proposal for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
(hereinafter EES) suggested in recent decades: the notion of a hierarchy in evolu-
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tionary biology together with its multi-level structure (see, for example, Gould 1980;
Gould 1982; Vrba and Gould 1986). Moreover, the EES proposed a general mecha-
nism, named selection. For example, in Lieberman and Vrba’s words, “selection is the
interaction between heritable, varying, emergent characters of individuals and the
environment that causes differences in birth and/or death rates of those individuals”
(Lieberman and Vrba 1995, p.394). Selection was, hence, conceptualized as a general
mechanism of which natural selection is only a particular case. In recent years, many
researchers have favored the incorporation of a general selection mechanism, acting
at different levels, into the conceptualization of the evolutionary processes (Jablon-
ski 2000; Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002; Shelton and Michod 2010; Wilson 2010).
This is known as “multi-level selection theory”, and it is recognized for its high “po-
tential for empirical and theoretical advances” (Jablonski 2010, p.344) and claimed
to be “essential to understanding long-term evolutionary processes” (Jablonski 2010,
p.350). Thus, multi-level structure and hierarchy within Evolutionary Biology will be
taken into account in our analysis of evo-devo mechanisms.
At this point, having settled the last considerations, it is important to remember
that the general question in our analysis is whether evo-devo mechanisms have a dual
function as generators and modifiers of biological variation. To this end, in the next
section we clarify the criteria adopted to recognize whether evo-devo mechanisms
modify and/or generate biological variation.
2.2. Mechanisms that modify biological variation
From an ES perspective, Mms are considered mechanisms that modify the frequen-
cies of genetic variants (genetic variation) between two generations for a particu-
lar population. It is important to note here that there are different scenarios where
there are no absolute changes but there are evolutionary mechanisms acting in a
compensatory way. Given the considerations made in the previous section, it cannot
be ignored that evolution presents a multi-level structure, thus the search for gen-
eral conditions to identify Mms and Mgs must incorporate a hierarchical perspective.
In this sense, even if the ES proposed different mechanisms to explain variational
changes over time, it is clear that from a hierarchical perspective the conditions to
be met in order to consider that a mechanism acts as an Mm could not be restricted
to the proposals of the ES. This would result in including only those mechanisms
involved with genetic variation at microevolutionary levels. Also, this definition may
present numerous problems, two of which could be easily identified. First, the no-
tion of a “generation” is very clear in the case of a population (at least for a great
number of vertebrate organisms), but it is not so evident for all evolutionary levels.
For instance, when analyzing the species level, what does “one generation” mean?
In any event, what is at stake is biological change through time, regardless of how
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biological entities at different levels pass through time. Second, in the case of the mi-
croevolutionary proposal within the ES, the population is assigned the evolutionary
role of being the unit of evolution; in a hierarchical proposal it may be necessary to
detect an analogous spatially and temporally defined entity for each one of the levels
of the hierarchy. The problem lies in that while it is easily designated in the case of
microevolution, it presents an imprecise status for other levels; i.e., which is the unit
of evolution when dealing with change between species? Given that conceiving of
units of evolution from a hierarchical point of view is not an easy or trivial task, we
will use the general term domain. This term represents any spatially and temporally
defined entity where evolutionary change happens at any level, with population (the
microevolutionary unit of evolution) being a special case of a domain. Therefore,
a more general criterion which enables the recognition of Mms at different levels of
the evolutionary dimension must be employed. Thus, from a hierarchical perspective,
Mms could be defined as those mechanisms that modify the frequencies of the types
of biological entities (some kind of biological variation) in a domain for a particular
interval of time.
Since this definition may present operative problems when trying to search for
biological mechanisms that fit into it, we decided that in order to identify Mms we
will follow an alternative path and propose that hierarchical Mms are those that, as
a consequence of their action, produce a biological phenomenon that is considered
an evolutionary event in the sense of the canonical version of the ES. As a direct
outcome, it is necessary to define which are the requirements that any mechanism
must satisfy to produce a biological phenomenon that is an evolutionary event in the
sense of the ES (and consequently be considered as an Mm). We recognize at least
three requirements that should be taken into account:
I. Minimum number
This requirement is motivated by Caponi’s (2008) proposal. It refers to the idea that
an evolutionary event, in the sense of the ES, must be composed of (at least) two
different biological types, and both (or all) with a number of representatives exten-
sively greater than one. In terms of the action of mechanisms, it implies that, to be
considered an Mm, any mechanism must produce (in the particular domain defined
for the level of biological organization where the mechanism acts) at least two dif-
ferent biological types, and both (or all) with a number of representatives greater
than one. As we can see, the problem of the diffuse boundary of the aforementioned
domain also becomes tangible here.
What is the relevance of this requirement? Its importance lies in that it is the first
step to differentiate Mgs from Mms, being that the results of the action of Mgs — a
temporally and spatially unique biological event — should not be considered as an
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evolutionary event in the sense of the canonical version of the ES. However, as we will
see, the minimum number requirement is necessary but not sufficient.
II. Repeatability
Prior to the recent proposal of an EES, the requirement of a steady repetition of bio-
logical variants trough time was exclusively guaranteed by means of genetic heredity.
However, in recent years, the number of ways that ensure the repetition of a particular
biological attribute over time has increased (see, for example, Jablonka et al. 1998;
Jablonka and Lamb 2010). In particular, we consider at least three different types of
repeatability: genetic heredity (repetition of a biological trait through time due to the
transmission of information by means of nucleotide sequence), broad-sense heredity
(repetition of a trait through time by means of another unit of information rather
than the genetic one, as, for example, epigenetic) and recurrence (a biological trait
is consistently originated through time but not due to the transmission of internal
information — whether genetic or epigenetic — but as consequence of the steady
repetition of another factor, for example, a similar environmental effect on a pheno-
type of any biological entity that repeats through time). As is obvious, this criterion
guarantees one of the necessary aspects of an evolutionary event in the sense of the
canonical version of the ES: its permanence throughout the passage of biological en-
tities over time within a domain for a particular level. The repeatability requirement
is also necessary but not sufficient.
III. Bias
The criterion of bias is inspired by Yampolsky and Stoltzfus’s (2001) population ge-
netics models concerning the requirements to be met by mutation for it to act as a
mechanism that modifies biological variation. In general terms, it is based on the dif-
ferential probability that a biological entity has of turning from a particular state to its
inverse (Figure 1a). When this requirement is met, the action of mechanisms changes
frequencies of biological entities in a given direction over time (Figure 1b1,2). This
requirement guarantees avoiding scenarios with a high number of changes that do
not produce any change in the global biological variation (Figure 2b1,2), due to sim-
ilar probabilities of turning from one biological state (variant) to its inverse (Figure
2a). As in the cases of minimum number and repeatability, the bias requirement is
necessary but not sufficient.
We recognize that ES thinkers considered mutation as an Mm when it acts in high
rates, even in the absence of bias. However, to evaluate the mechanisms of evo-devo
we took a different approach, perhaps more restrictive (or hard), and include bias as
one of the requirements to be met by any evo-devo mechanism to be considered as
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an Mm. This decision was taken to prevent evo-devo mechanisms considered as Mms
from falling into the category of unimportant or weak evolutionary mechanisms, as
happens with mutation in the ES (Fisher 1930; Haldane 1933).
Figure 1: Changes in variation through time due to the action of hierarchical mech-
anisms that produce bias. (a) As a consequence of the action of the mechanisms, the
probabilities of turning from a particular state to its inverse are different. In the ex-
ample, each circle represents a unitary biological item of any domain and the prob-
ability of turning from the “gray variant” to the “white variant” is larger than the
inverse. (b1) Simplified representation of the change of a hypothetical biological do-
main through time when the mechanism involved produces bias. Different colors of
biological entities are different variants. (b2) Change of relative frequencies of vari-
ants in the presence of bias. Note that there is important and consistent modification
of variation through time.
Following the description of the requirements that a mechanism must meet to
be considered an evolutionary event in the sense of the canonical version of the ES,
it is clear that these requirements have different roles in our analysis. In this sense,
bias can only take place if the mechanism at stake previously fulfills the requirements
PRINCIPIA 22(2): 251–275 (2018)
The Dual Role of Evo-Devo Mechanisms 259
of minimum number and repeatability. Thus, bias is a subsidiary requirement of the
principal requirements of minimum number and repeatability.
2.3. Mechanisms that generate biological variation
When trying to clarify the criteria for recognizing mechanisms that act as biological
variation generators (Mgs), once again, it is not easy to establish a general criterion
suitable for the different levels of a hierarchy. From an ES perspective, classical genet-
ics provides a great number of Mgs. In this context, Mgs are those mechanisms that
generate any type of genetic variant that did not exist previously (de novo genetic
variation) in a particular population from one generation to the next. In this sense,
in addition to the consideration of de novo generation of biological variation in an
ES sense, we must include innovation and novelty as different cases of generation
of biological variation with respect to the case mentioned in the ES. There are sev-
eral conceptualizations of novelty and innovation within evo-devo as part of the EES.
Two common features of these conceptualizations are that they include a hierarchi-
cal perspective of the origin of de novo biological structures and/or functions, a clear
reference to the inclusion of macroevolutionary levels; and that the changes involved
are qualitative, rather than quantitative as in the ES (Müller and Wagner 1991; Love
2006; Pigliucci 2008; Müller 2010; Brigandt and Love 2012). Following the strategy
of analysis presented in the introduction, and as will become clear below, the notion
of Mg presented include both conceptualizations of de novo generation of biological
characteristics.
As in the case of Mms, if evolutionary biology is conceived of from a hierarchical
perspective, the microevolutionary definition of Mg may present several problems;
two of them are those previously described for Mms, and in this case one more is
added. This additional problem with Mgs has to do with the need to establish a clear
criterion to determine what a variant is. In a hierarchical definition, each level should
present a particular notion of a biological variant, which in most cases may differ or
be broader than a strict microevolutionary notion. Thus, a clear criterion to deter-
mine what a biological variant is must be established. In general terms, this may be
the least problematic issue that arises when using the hierarchical definition of Mg,
because the notion of a biological variant is present, more or less explicitly, within
each area of knowledge that studies different levels. Therefore, from a hierarchical
perspective, and after considering the two problems outlined above and the addi-
tional Mg difficulty, Mgs could be understood as those mechanisms that act through
time generating a particular variant that did not exist previously in the domain of the
level being analyzed.
As in the case of Mms, the operative problems of trying to search for biological
mechanisms that act as established by the hierarchical definition of Mg led us to
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Figure 2: Changes in variation through time due to the action of hierarchical mech-
anisms that do not produce bias. (a) As a consequence of the action of the mecha-
nisms, the probabilities of turning from a particular state to its inverse are equal. In
the example, each circle represents a unitary biological item of any domain and the
probability of turning from the “gray variant” to the “white variant” is the same as
the inverse. (b1) Simplified representation of the change of a hypothetical biological
domain through time when the mechanism involved does not produce bias. Different
colors of biological items are different variants. (b2) Change of relative frequencies of
variants in the absence of bias. Note that there is not a consistent change of biological
variation through time
consider a different way of recognizing them. This alternative proposal is derived
from what has been said of the requirements that a mechanism must meet to be
considered an evolutionary event in the sense of the canonical version of the ES. In
this context, we propose that any mechanism behaves as a hierarchical Mg if, as a
consequence of its action, the minimum number, repeatability and bias requirements
are not simultaneously met.
To illustrate the last point, we can analyze the aforementioned case of mutation
in situations where there are low mutation rates. In these scenarios, this mechanism
does not meet the principal requirement of minimum number and, as proposed by
Yampolsky and Stoltzfus (2001), it produces no bias; but considering the nature of
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mutation, this mechanism always fulfills the principal requirement of repeatability.
Therefore, when mutation acts at low mutation rates the three requirements cannot
be met simultaneously, so in this scenario mutation acts as an Mg. In broader terms
that also include innovation and novelty, when mechanisms act as hierarchical Mgs
they only generate new variants trough time (Figure 3a). They do not drive evolution,
as there is no constant drive of biological variation through time as a consequence of
their action (Figure 3b).1
Figure 3: Changes in biological variation through time due to the action of hierarchi-
cal mechanisms that generate variation (hierarchical Mgs). (a) Simplified represen-
tation of change of hypothetical biological entities through time when hierarchical
Mgs occur. Each circle represents a unitary biological entity of any domain. Different
colors of biological entities are different variants. (b) Changes in the relative frequen-
cies of variants as a consequence of the action of a hierarchical Mg. Note that there
is not a consistent modification of variation through time.
In the next section, we will analyze three evo-devo mechanisms: somatic selec-
tion, environmental induction and developmental bias. In each case, we will describe
the mechanism, present documented examples of its action in nature, and then ana-
lyze whether they have the potential to act as Mms and/or Mgs.
3. Evo-devo mechanism analysis
3.1. Hypervariability/somatic selection
Mechanism description
This mechanism functions in two stages. First, a large number of random variants,
modifications, movements or positions of any biological trait are produced, which is
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known as hypervariability. Then, some variants persist while the remainder are elim-
inated or unoccupied, producing somatic selection. The action of this mechanism is
strongly influenced by the environment and it occurs without central coordination,
i.e., hypervariability does not have any direct genetic causes but rather is the result
of the inherent interactive properties of the materials that form life (West-Eberhard
2003). As a consequence of these properties, this mechanism produces a relatively
large array of local biological variants in short periods of time. An early documented
example of the action of this mechanism is plant circumnutation, described in 1880
by Darwin in The Power of Movement in Plants, and it refers to erratic exploratory
growth movements of stems, roots and leaves that continue insofar as an event or
stimulus directs them. Darwin described stem searching movements toward light by
marking them on a horizontal glass (example and figure are cited and reproduced
in West-Eberhard 2003, p.39). Also in West-Eberhard (2003), two additional exam-
ples of hypervariability followed by somatic selection are presented: nervous system
organization and vertebrate immune system action.
Hypervariability/somatic selection as Mm
Since this mechanism could produce a relatively large array of variants of local range,
several new variants could be produced at any given moment in the history of a bi-
ological entity, each with a near-to-zero probability of being produced and of being
almost unique. This is represented in Figure 4a as a probability of 1/n of producing
any variant from a preexisting one, n being the number of variants and, in this case,
a large number of variants. Thus, since the probability that any of these new vari-
ants is represented in some organismic structure — the domain of action — with a
number greater than one is near to zero, this scenario is in disagreement with the
minimum number requirement. Also, if each one of the variants produced is almost
unique, then all variants should have roughly the same small probability of being
produced and it would be almost impossible that any given variant originates at two
different moments through time, and therefore this mechanism cannot produce any
kind of repeatability (Figure 4b1). Due to its failure to meet the repeatability and
minimum number requirements, hypervariability/somatic selection cannot act as an
Mm. It could be alleged that the bias requirement could be met if the probability of
producing a new variant is lower than that of returning from a new local biological
variant to the wild type, which seems to be the case; but since for our analysis of Mms
the bias requirement only makes sense if the other two requirements are previously
met, this ceases to be important.
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Figure 4: Changes in variation through time due to the action of hypervariabil-
ity/somatic selection. (a) As a consequence of the action of the mechanisms, a rel-
atively large array of variants of local range are produced and the probability of
generating any of the variants from a preexisting one is 1/n, n being the number
of variants and a large number. In the example, each circle represents a particular
phenotypic variant. (b1) Simplified representation of the change of hypothetical bio-
logical items through time when hypervariability/somatic selection acts. Each circle
represents a unitary biological item. Different colors and forms of biological items are
different phenotypic variants. (b2) Changes in the relative frequencies of variants as a
consequence of the action of hypervariability/somatic selection. Note that there is no
relevant and consistent change of variation through time, since most new phenotypic
variants drop to a relative frequency of zero immediately after being originated
Hypervariability/somatic selection as Mg
Since as a consequence of its action this mechanism cannot meet the minimum num-
ber, repeatability and bias requirements simultaneously, we propose that this mecha-
nism can act as an Mg. Moreover, based on the description of the mechanism and the
examples observed in nature, it becomes clear that through its action, hypervariabil-
ity/somatic selection generates a relatively large collection of previously nonexistent
biological variants (Figure 4a, b1).
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Partial conclusions about the hypervariability/somatic selection mechanism
This mechanism failed to meet the repeatability and minimum number requirements,
thus it cannot act as an Mm even if it meets the bias requirement. Instead, it clearly
fulfills the requirements to act as an Mg, generating previously nonexistent biological
variants as a consequence of its action. In this case, the mechanism occurs within the
organism domain, at the tissue or organ level. As can be observed in Figure 4, as this
mechanism acts, there are many new variants produced at any given time, and none
of these new biological types are very likely to occur with a number greater than one.
Therefore, hypervariability/somatic selection is not a mechanism that can have the
dual role of generating biological variation and driving variational changes.
3.2. Environmental induction
Mechanism description
In this case, the environment acting as an input affects a pre-existing phenotype,
driving a change or reorganization that generates a phenotypic variant that is quali-
tatively different from pre-existing phenotypes and new, i.e., that previously did not
exist (Figure 5b1). If the input is recurrent, a group of individuals with the new phe-
notype is generated. This mechanism is well described in West-Eberhard (2003) and
considered important on several occasions, as, for example, in Griffiths and Gray
(2004), Jablonka (2006) and Jablonka and Lamb (2010). There are numerous doc-
umented examples of environmental induction. The yeast Candida albicans switch
from normal yeast cell morphology (white) to an elongated cell type (opaque), which
is the mating-competent form of the fungus, induced by anaerobic environmental
conditions (Ramirez-Zavala et al. 2008). In both a native and newly established pop-
ulation of finches, breeding females exhibit a novel phenotype in ovulation sequence
related to a population-specific environmental stimulus. In the new population, the
novel phenotype is induced by a novel environment during females’ first breeding and
is subsequently retained across breeding attempts. In the native population, the phe-
notype may also be originated by a novel environmental input and seems to be main-
tained by recurrent environmental stimulus (Badyaev and Oh 2008). West-Eberhard
(2003) cites two more examples: one originally described by Wilson in 1984, where
the sea urchin (Sphaerechinus granularis) that bred in an environment without cal-
careous material or with a small excess of potassium lacks the feeding structures typ-
ical of this species, which are present when larvae are bred in an environment rich in
calcareous material; and the other proposes that seasonal polyphenism in butterflies
originated by environmental induction.
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Figure 5: Changes in variation through time due to the action of environmental in-
duction. (a) As a consequence of the action of the mechanisms, the probabilities of
passing from a particular phenotypic variant to its alternative are different in dif-
ferent environments. In the example, each circle represents a particular phenotypic
variant and the probabilities of passing from the “gray phenotype” to the “white phe-
notype” are inverse in environments A and B. (b1) Simplified representation of the
change of hypothetical biological items through time when environmental induction
acts. Each circle represents a unitary biological item. Different colors and forms of
biological items are different phenotypic variants. The “lightning” represents the en-
vironmental input promoting the induction. (b2) Changes in the relative frequencies
of variants as a consequence of the action of environmental induction. Note that the
possibility of a relevant and consistent change of biological variation through time is
guaranteed
Environmental induction as Mm
This mechanism can explain the apparition of large amounts of variants in a short in-
terval of time, given that it produces several different biological types with a number
of representatives extensively greater than one as a consequence of its action (Fig-
ure 5b1). This was previously pointed out by Jablonka (2006) and Griffiths and Gray
(2004), and is in agreement with the minimum number requirement. Also, due to the
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characteristics of the mechanism discussed, the probability of generating one pheno-
typic variant or its alternative could be different in different environments (Figure
5a). This situation is considered as bias and it produces a change in global variation
due to dissimilar probabilities of turning from one biological state (variant) to its in-
verse (Figure 5b2). Finally, repeatability can be achieved by environmental induction
in two ways: (i) recurrence over time of the environmental conditions responsible for
the induction, which has been proposed by West-Eberhard (2003, p.144); and (ii) by
means of broad-sense heredity in the form of heritable epigenetic variation originally
induced by an environmental stimulus which does not need recurrence of the envi-
ronmental condition (Jablonka and Raz 2009; Jablonka and Lamb 2010). Since it
fulfills all three requirements posed, environmental induction can act as an Mm.
Environmental induction as Mg
Given the nature of this mechanism, there are potentially numerous scenarios where
theminimum number and repeatability requirements could not be simultaneously met
(the bias requirement is subordinated to these two requirements, so in this case its
status does not matter); or where minimum number and repeatability requirements
could be simultaneously met but the action of environmental induction does not pro-
duce bias (when the probability of generating one phenotypic variant or its alterna-
tive is the same in different environments). In those cases environmental induction
would be acting as an Mg. Moreover, given that the various examples described pre-
viously are just a small sample of the ubiquity of cases where the environment affects
a pre-existing phenotype, driving a change or reorganization that generates a pheno-
typic variant, and that in a number of these cases some of the requirements to produce
an evolutionary event in the sense of the ES could not be met, it’s rather straightfor-
ward to propose the potentiality of environmental induction to act as a mechanism
that only generates previously nonexistent biological variants (Figure 5b1).
Partial conclusions about the environmental induction mechanism
Environmental induction has the potential to satisfy all the requirements we pose
must be met to produce an evolutionary event and act as an Mm. Also, given that
in some natural situations some of the requirements to produce an evolutionary fact
could not be met as a consequence of the action of this mechanism, in these cases
environmental induction would only be generating previously nonexistent particu-
lar biological variants, i.e., acting as an Mg. The domain of action of environmental
induction is at the level of population or higher. Therefore, environmental induction
presents the dual role of generating variation and driving variational changes.
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3.3. Developmental bias
Mechanism description
This mechanism is based on eve-devo’s central notion that, somewhere between mu-
tation and selection, development plays a causal role in evolution. Arthur proposed
that the link between the supply of variation (new genes or alleles) produced by
mutations and the action of natural selection on phenotypes is the developmental
system, which is itself always changing. Thus, when mutations occur in genes that
control developmental trajectories, they can be more readily altered in some possible
trajectories than in others (Arthur 2001a; 2001b; 2002). As Scholl and Pigliucci put
it: “the availability of developmental variants co-determines the direction of evolu-
tion” (Scholl and Pigliucci 2014, p.7). Positive (developmental drive) and negative
(developmental constraint) biases are possible. Developmental bias is related to the
degrees of variation in developmental pathways, generating a continuum between
highly structured/sparsely variable and loosely structured/highly variable develop-
mental systems (Arthur 2001a; 2001b; 2002) (Figure 6a). Through his research,
Arthur documented examples of this mechanism in species of the Lithobiomorpha
and Geophilomorpha centipede orders. In the former order, the number of trunk seg-
ments, and hence leg pairs, is fixed at 15 for all species. In the latter, the number is
variable both within and between species, but all species have an even number of
segments. The proposal is that this phenotypic variation is developmentally driven
(Arthur 2002).
Developmental bias as Mm
As can be clearly observed in Figure 6, this mechanism can explain the apparition
of at least two biological variants of different types, each one with a number of rep-
resentatives extensively greater than one in the domain where this mechanism acts,
fulfilling the requirement of minimum number. With respect to the bias requirement,
Arthur wrote: “. . . it is clear that developmental reprogramming provides an addi-
tional possible source of directionality (. . . ), which might be effective even if the
molecular-level changes caused by mutation were entirely random. This direction-
ality lies in the as-yet unknown limitations of developmental systems that permit
reprogramming in some directions but result in constraint elsewhere (e.g., the “pro-
hibited” even-segment-number centipedes)” (Arthur 2000, p.55). In this sense, bias
is guaranteed, since the probability of turning from one biological state (variant) to
its inverse or any other state is not equal (Figure 6a). Lastly, repeatability can be
achieved by means of genetic heredity and also by means of broad-sense heredity
in the form of any of the types of epigenetic inheritance described by Jablonka and
Lamb (2010).
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Figure 6: Changes in variation through time in the context of developmental bias.
(a) All the potential developmental trajectories (dashed arrows) can be more readily
altered in some possible trajectories than in others. This produces an array of pos-
sibilities called developmental continuum, developmental drive being the extreme
positive bias and developmental constraint the extreme negative bias. (b1) Simpli-
fied representation of the change of a hypothetical biological domain through time
when developmental drives occur. Each circle represents a unitary biological entity.
Different colors and forms of biological items are different phenotypic variants. (b2)
Changes in the relative frequencies of variants as a consequence of the action of envi-
ronmental induction. Note that the possibility exists of a relevant change of biological
variation through time
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Developmental bias as Mg
Given the nature of this mechanism, it seems that when it acts it is not possible for the
minimum number, repeatability and bias requirements not to be simultaneously met.
That is to say, if developmental bias acts, it always fulfills the three requirements and
produces an evolutionary fact — a characteristic shared with, for example, natural
selection — and it cannot potentially act as an Mg. The scenario will be as follows:
variation always arises from changes in genes that control development and the ac-
tion of the mechanism consists only in handling this biological variation, similar to
what happens when natural selection acts. By itself, developmental bias does not
seem to be able to produce previously nonexistent biological variants; it can only
drive its changes in some of the possible established directions.
Partial conclusions about the developmental bias mechanism
In the case of developmental bias, all the requirements we pose must be met to pro-
duce an evolutionary fact are always fulfilled, therefore it only acts as an Mm. The
action of this mechanism as a driver of evolution can be appreciated in Figure 6b1,2,
where it is clear that when developmental bias occurs, the possibility of a relevant
change of biological variation through time is quite certain. On the contrary, we can-
not say that, as a consequence of the action of developmental bias, previously nonex-
istent and particular biological variants are produced. All in all, this mechanism only
acts as a modifier of variation that drives variational changes at above-species levels.
4. General conclusions and final remarks
Our analysis shows a different characterization of evo-devo mechanisms in terms of
their relation to biological variation. Environmental induction is the only evo-devo
mechanism that indeed seems to have a dual role of acting as generator and modifier
of biological variation, while hypervariability/somatic selection only acts as a gen-
erator of de novo variation and developmental bias is only a modifier of biological
variation (Table 1). In this scenario, maybe the most interesting case to analyze the
action of evo-devo mechanisms with respect to biological variation is environmental
induction, a mechanism that presents a dual role of Mm and Mg. In order to char-
acterize the nature of this dual role, we suggest three possible scenarios to answer
the question: in what situations does environmental induction act as an Mm or Mg?
At first, two extreme scenarios can be presented. One is when repeatability occurs
by means of recurrence of an environmental effect; in this case it is more proba-
ble that environmental induction acts as an Mm. This is so because the effect of the
mechanism would reach a large part of the biological entities comprising the domain
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involved, thus the apparition and maintenance of different biological types with a
number of representatives extensively greater than one is highly probable, whereby
the minimum number requirement is most probably met. The other extreme situation
is when, as a consequence of the action of an environmental effect, a genetic modi-
fication occurs and the environmental input presents no recurrence. In this situation
the genetic variant originated is quite probably unique; consequently, environmen-
tal induction is acting as an Mg. There is an interesting intermediate scenario where
repeatability is obtained by means of broad-sense heredity in the form of heritable
epigenetic variation (once the environmental input ceases). Here, the effect of the
mechanism would reach a smaller part of the biological entities comprising the do-
main than in the extreme recurrence scenario, and a larger part than in the genetic
modification scenario. Depending on the scope that the action of the mechanism has
by means of heritable epigenetic variation, i.e., the number of representatives of dif-
ferent biological types consistently generated through time, it would be acting as an
Mm or an Mg. Finally, we could ask whether, as in the case of mutation in the ES, the
action of environmental induction should be mainly taken as one type of mechanism
or the other. If we consider the scenarios for the action of environmental induction
proposed, the way that repeatability is achieved is one of the factors that defines
whether the mechanisms will act as an Mm or as an Mg. The possibilities range from
recurrence of an environmental input through time without any genetic inheritance
involved (environmental induction acting as Mm), to a unique event of environmen-
tal induction producing a single genetic change that is inherited by means of classic
genetic inheritance (environmental induction acting as Mg). In the middle of these
two extreme scenarios there is an array of possibilities that involves repeatability by
means of broad-sense heredity in the form of heritable epigenetic variation, which
does not need repetition of an environmental input nor changes at the genetic level
plus genetic inheritance. It does not seem to be evident that one of the extreme sce-
narios is more likely to happen in nature than the other; and, in any case, the multiple
intermediate scenarios could be favorable both for environmental induction acting as
an Mm or as a Mg. Therefore, we cannot say that environmental induction acts more
consistently as an Mg or Mm, and the possibility that it fulfills both roles in nature is
not unlikely.
In terms of the comparison with the ES and looking at the three evo-devo mecha-
nisms analyzed, altogether it does not seem to be a more relevant role, which would
have been the case if all evo-devo mechanisms where characterized only asMm orMg.
This represents a differentiation with respect to the ES, where, despite recognizing
mechanisms in both categories, the ES considers that the relevant mechanisms are
those that modify or drive variation, mainly natural selection. This is clearly stated in
a quote by Ernst Mayr where he describes internal differences among ES architects
on what evolution was: “evolution continued for the geneticists to be a change of
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gene frequencies, (. . . ) while for the naturalists, evolution was a series of processes
resulting in adaptedness and diversity (. . . )” (Mayr 1993, p.32). Thus, even with dif-
ferences, ES architects focused in the study of change of biological variation (mainly
genetic variation) rather than the study of de novo generation of variation. These
shared characteristics, in spite of differences in the way mechanisms act between
the ES and evo-devo, are important in the understanding of the type of extension to
evolutionary theory implied in the incorporation of evo-devo — particularly in rela-
tion to mechanisms, and in particular to the insufficiency in explaining evolutionary
phenomena of diverse domains that was pointed out to the ES in recent decades
(Amundson 2005). Furthermore, the strategy chosen of using ES categories to un-
derstand the action of evo-devo mechanisms is not a question of whether or not we
ascribe them to these categories, or to the ES, since they are actually used (Amund-
son 2005, p.167), but rather a way of approaching the problem of the relationship
between the ES and evo-devo indicated by previous authors within the philosophy of
biology (for example, see Amundson 2005 and Pigliucci 2008). Our analysis shows
that the distinction of Mgs and Mms that comes from the canonical version of the
ES is maintained in evo-devo, while the ES preference towards Mms and population
centrism was not found. Also, moving away from considering evo-devo mechanisms
mainly as Mgs, as is usually done, and considering them as legitimate Mms allows
to show that reducing Mm to the four mechanisms proposed by the ES and giving
more importance to natural selection is a problem. This suggests that new lines of
investigation are required to overcome these problems.
Heterogeneity in the roles that evo-devo mechanisms play in biological varia-
tion shows that the distinction, originally found in the ES, between mechanisms that
generate and mechanisms that modify or drive variation is heuristically useful to un-
derstand these mechanisms. Also, we propose that heterogeneity in the action of the
mechanisms found in our analysis (Table 1) and the need to deepen our understand-
ing thereof in evo-devo are related to the recent origin of evo-devo and its intrinsic
diversity and multiplicity of goals (Laubichler 2007; Müller 2008). But beyond this,
our analysis points out that, at least with respect to the action of mechanisms, evo-
devo extends and departs from what was proposed in the ES.
These contributions can be summarized in three aspects. First, it is commonly
thought that evo-devo mainly deals with Mgs: “(. . . ) the reach of evolutionary theory
is expanded in that evo-devo accounts not for what kinds of variation are going to
be maintained through natural selection, but also what kinds of variation can possi-
bly arise from specific developmental systems” (Müller 2007, p.947). However, our
analysis shows that the contribution of evo-devo to evolutionary biology not only
has to do with mechanisms that generate variation where there was none, but also
with mechanisms that change or drive biological variation. Second, at least one of
the mechanisms of evo-devo, environmental induction, has a dual role of acting as
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Table 1. Summary of the analysis of evo-devo mechanisms. All possible biological
scenarios in terms of requirements to produce an evolutionary event in the sense of
the canonical version of the ES are shown, as well as expectations in terms of de novo
variant origination and variational changes (or stasis) in nature. Table 1 also shows
in which scenarios each of the evo-devo mechanisms acts.
Mg: mechanism that generates biological variation. Mn: mechanism that modifies
biological variation
an Mm and an Mg. Additionally, it does not seem to be given a more relevant role.
Thus, the possibility that it fulfills both roles in nature is quite certain. This represents
another differentiation with respect to the ES, where mutation is widely recognized
to have a dual role, but the Mm role is minimized as unimportant, leaving mutation
fundamentally as anMg. Finally, we propose that broad-sense heredity, especially epi-
genetic inheritance, plays an important role in the action of evo-devo mechanisms.
The importance of epigenetic inheritance in evolution has been previously treated
by many authors (see, for example, Jablonka et al. 1998; Jablonka and Raz 2009;
Jablonka and Lamb 2010), but in our analysis it plays a specific role in the action of
different mechanisms, and it is another way in which we find an expansion of the ES.
In conclusion, in the present paper we provide a theoretical analysis of evo-devo
mechanisms to offer evidence of how evo-devo is providing new conceptual and theo-
retical elements to evolutionary biology. It is also our understanding that the analysis
that we conducted presents some of the many possible ways in which evo-devo is ex-
panding and changing evolutionary synthesis.
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Notes
1One last clarification needs to be made. The fact that in the Mm/Mg distinction the notion
of an evolutionary event, in the sense of the ES, falls on theMm side does not mean we consider
that Mgs have less relevance in evolution. Moreover, since this distinction with its categories
and the conceptualization that come from the ES is actually used in evolutionary biology, it
becomes irrelevant to the analysis we aim to perform whether or not we think the distinction
is correct. As was indicated above, we are using the ES’s own categories and conceptualization
as a viable strategy to understand evo-devo mechanisms’ role in evolution and its relation to
the ES.
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